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  is essay will analyze several famous speeches pronounced throughout the 
European Project across thirty years, from  e Hague Congress until the late seven-
ties of the twentieth century. It aims to explore the rhetoric of fear in the European 
Construction, that is, recurring statements on the fear of losing Europe, going back 
to an era of division. It will aim at answering this question through the analysis 
of the speeches of protagonists of the European Project (mainly members of the 
European institutions).  is essay will analyze how this fear is part of the constitu-
tive matrix of the European idea as Dennis de Rougemont pointed out.
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Este ensaio analisa vários discursos famosos que foram pronunciados ao longo de 
trinta anos de projecto Europeu, do Congresso Europeu de 1948 na Haia até ao % m 
dos anos 70 do século XX. Tenta-se explorar a retórica do medo durante a cons-
trução europeia, i.e., várias declarações que foram feitas sobre o medo de perder a 
Europa e vê-la regressar a uma época de divisões. Tenta-se responder a esta ques-
tão através da análise de discursos dos protagonistas do projecto Europeu (princi-
palmente membros das instituições europeias). Talvez este medo, que parece estar 
presente em momentos pontuais e parece bastante residual senão irrelevante, faz na 
verdade parte de uma mundividência presente na teoria política que Isaiah Berlin 
descreveu com agudeza e é parte da matriz constitutiva das ideias europeias como 
apontou Denis de Rougemont.
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1. The European project at the light of continuities and 
ruptures in contemporary politics
Isaiah Berlin identi% ed two major political trends in the nineteenth cen-
tury, “humanitarian individualism and romantic nationalism” (Berlin, 
2000, p. 59). Showing his proverbial talent to grasp complex phenomena 
in a simple formula, he noted that in spite of their dissimilarities — “pro-
found enough to lead to a sharp divergence and ultimate collision of these 
two ideals” — these currents shared a common belief, that is, the convic-
tion that the “problems both of individuals and societies could be solved.” 
Liberals believed in education, socialists in a complete change of distri-
bution of property and the control of economic resources, conservatives 
believed in institutions, etc.
It was not without malice that Berlin also noted that “[I]f chronologi-
cal frontiers are seldom landmarks in the history of ideas,” (Berlin, 2000, p. 
68) the picture was altered with the entering of the twentieth century, and 
these trends “% nally ended in exaggerated and indeed distorted forms as 
Communism and Fascism” (Berlin, 2000, p. 60). It became apparent that 
the administration of things would not replace the government of men and 
that no universal solution could be found to the most pressing problems. 
  is implies that we can no longer believe that “great edi% ces promote soli-
darity, security and (…) strength” (Berlin, 2000, p. 60).
Some apparent lines of continuity can be discerned: “to the casual 
observer of the politics and the thought of the twentieth century it might 
at % rst seem that every idea and movement typical of our time is best 
understood as a natural development of tendencies already prominent in 
the nineteenth century” (Berlin, 2000,  p. 61).  is almost looks like a tru-
ism in the case of the growth of international institutions, from the old 
Hague Court to the post-war Hague Congress, passing through the League 
of Nations.
  e European project is one of these cases of both continuity and rup-
ture. According to Berlin, what marks the divide are two main changes in 
the political view (Berlin, 2000,  p. 61): the role of irrational or unconscious 
forces driving events oG en outweighing the “forces of reason;” and a trend 
to remove the problems not by argument but by their “removal.”
Rhetoric is an instrument to “tame” these irrational forces. It is not only 
useful for a politician or a statesman to rationally explain what he has in 
mind in order to convince his audience, but also in academic circles or in 
rational argument. However statesmen need to add emotional dimension 
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to rational argument through the building of a narrative, the construction 
of a challenge, the appeal to a utopia or an ideal. Within the European pro-
ject, fear is certainly a key aspect of this rhetorical narrative: the idea that 
Europe will fall back to an era of war, nationalism and divisions, if the pro-
ject is not carried on.
  e argument that, without the European institutions, Europe can 
recede into a state of war makes sense in a rational way. Nonetheless, when 
one gives enough emphasis to this idea by forcefully repeating it, making 
suggestive analogies, dramatizing and using speci% c key-words, then one is 
faced with a discourse that is reinforced by emotional appeal. A politician 
frequently uses powerful narratives in order to instill fear and hope in his 
public target, thus acquiring a new persuasive dimension.
  e analysis of some speeches from protagonists of the European pro-
ject can enlighten how Berlin’s trends exist within the European project. 
As it will be shown, the diminishing of fear in those speeches coincides 
with the emergence of Berlin’s trend of “removing” the problems instead 
of debating them. AG er some necessary historical contextualization, this 
article will proceed with the analysis of fear per se.
2. Tragic dimension of History and awareness of a common 
danger
Unreason and dreams — the tragic dimension of history — are in the 
deep roots of the European the situation aG er the Second World War.
We may follow Raymond Aron’s eO orts to understand the post war situ-
ation. AG er the guns of World War II went silent (Aron, 1948b, p. 13), noth-
ing remained of the European concert of powers and Europe became a no 
man’s land between two giants. No one expected a Russian-American idyll 
(Aron, 1948b, p. 1948), but many expected a truce. What happened were 
two important changes that were expected to last: the uni% cation of the 
diplomatic % eld on the planet, which is the result of the solidarity between 
continents and the progress of technology; and the formation of a bipolar 
world, an almost mechanical consequence of the devastation of Europe.
Two other eO ects were to be less permanent but no less important.  e 
% rst is the partial destruction of the equilibrium of the “balance of powers,” 
that kept war within limits through the XIX century.  e other is the expan-
sion of the empire’s rivalry in a “total diplomacy” that is not limited to mili-
tary intervention: any election campaign is now an episode of the Cold War. 
  is situation changes the normal concept of peace that, so far, involved the 
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limitation of what was at stake and of the means used. Now everything is 
at stake: economy, political system, ruling class.  at is what Hitler called 
“comprehensive strategy” and that Raymond Aron had already analyzed in 
the draG  text on machiavelisms written in 1939-40 (Aron, 1993).
If the world seems divided between the hegemony of the two “state-
continents,” this does not mean that the choice between the American and 
Russian side are equivalent.  e American ruling class does not want to 
shiG  its industrial potential into a military one and it sees its own action as 
a “burden” to endure.  e United States also do not maintain a state police 
or the monopoly of power in countries occupied militarily, while the entry 
into the Soviet sphere is irreversible, which gives a peculiarly ironic mean-
ing to the word “contention” in the Stalin’s mouth.
But “the absence of peace is not war” (Aron, 1948b, p. 26). It is not 
likely that war will be triggered by an incident like Sarajevo in 1914.  ere 
will be war only if any of the great powers desire it resolutely and, given the 
uncertainty of the military balance, no one wants it and, therefore, it will 
only happen if one of the sides wants to reach a goal that the other consid-
ers unacceptable. “In this way, the current balance that does not exclude 
precariousness is explained” (Aron, 1948b, 29). Stalin is not a romantic: he 
is as ambitious as Hitler was, but less impatient.  erefore, Aron predicts, 
he will % rst try to increase its industrial potential.
Europe is divided by an “Iron Curtain” (Baverez, 2006, p. 206)[1] but, 
although it refuses to recognize this situation, it has a shared common 
culture with America - whose originality lies in science, industrialization 
and social rationalization - and West Germany is an integral part of this 
Europe, which despite the current vacuum, it is still a great power.  e idea 
of European unity was more inspired by prudence than by enthusiasm, but 
“it would not be the % rst time that unity is born from the awareness of a 
common danger” (Aron, 1993, p. 68). 
  e common enemy was for a long time the communist danger. Against 
the hopes of those who mistook the communist regime with a personal des-
potism, Raymond Aron foresees a long period of time for this great schism, 
a schism that the death of Stalin will not overcome (Aron, 1981, pp. 329-
340)[2], because communism was not an ordinary tyranny.
1 A formula that Aron uses in his printed work of 1948, right aG er Churchill’s famous speech in 
Fulton in 1946, but he used this expression much before that. (Baverez, 2006, p. 206).
2   is idea is explained in a chapter that is lacking in the original version but that is present in the 
English translation of Les guerres en châine. Cfr. Raymond Aron, , e century of total, Westport 
(Conn), Greenwood Press, 1981, (ed. or. Garden City (NY), 1954, Doubleday), pp. 329-340. 
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In spite of these circumstances, there has been in the European project 
two symmetrical discourses: one of fear and hope, and the other of experts 
and solutions.
3. Hague Congress of 1948
  e % rst meeting to address the question of a federal Europe was, without 
a doubt, the Hague Congress of 1948.  is is where many of the ideological 
foundations of the European Project would be established. Most notably, it 
was in this Congress that the duality between a “positive” way of thinking 
the Union (federation of common market) and a “negative” way (fear of war 
and nationalisms) saw the light. 
Denis de Rougemont, an inZ uent pro-federalist, reZ ects this duality in a 
speech he gave a few days before the Hague Congress: the European ideal is 
a kind of a reversed utopia, one that de% nes itself more by the fear of what it 
wants to avoid than by a positive plan. In the words of Rougemont: “  e slo-
gan of fear, ‘  e defence [sic] of Europe’, de% nes today’s utopia.”(Rougemont, 
1948, p. 2) But this, says Rougemont, is not sustainable: we need to desire 
a federation, a Europe without borders.  e idea of fear as a stimulant to 
move towards a uni% ed Europe is clearly present in this text, but always 
goes in hand with the idea of a positive plan. For instance, and aG er listing 
some reasons for why there should be such a Europe, Rougemont % nally 
adds:
Lastly, we want Europe because without it the world is sliding towards 
war, and the only option we have leG  now is to prevent that war or to perish 
in it. Separated and isolated, none of our countries can prevent anything; we 
will be colonised [sic] one aG er the other, for all our national sovereignty (...) If 
we have a federation, on the other hand, we will be as strong as the two Great 
Powers (Rougemont, 1948, p. 3).
  ose words of Rougemont were quite clear: divided, we are weak, 
close to war, and powerless.  e only way is forwards, with a positive plan 
that will make Europe strong. At this time, the Russian threat was serious: 
Rougemont says that it is a danger which causes fear and that the Europeans 
can only counteract by creating a Western bloc. However, although 
Rougemont talks signi% cantly about the Soviet Union, he did not consider 
this to be the most dangerous problem Europe was facing:
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(…) the real obstacles to a federation of Europe are not primarily in the 
East; they are here among us. It all comes back to our internal problems, espe-
cially the two burning issues that I referred to a short while ago: the problem 
which nationalist prejudice causes us, and, parallel to that, the problem of par-
tisan spirit (Rougemont, 1948, p. 7).
Nationalisms and their divisive spirit: those are, according to 
Rougemont, the real threat of a united Europe: 
Ladies and gentlemen, if Europe, the mother of nations and parties, does 
not devise ways of overcoming nationalism and the partisan spirit, I cannot see 
who in the world could do it with any prospect of success. 
  is speech is quite representative of the spirit that would animate the 
Hague Congress some days later:  a delicate combination between “positive” 
reasons for a federal Europe and “negative” reasons to do so.  ere were, on 
the one hand, speeches full of hope: many speakers supported a “European 
utopia” and freely spoke about it. Étienne Gilson, for instance, speaks about 
the necessity of a “foi animatrice” in Europe through a cultural and intel-
lectual union (Gilson, 1948, p. 2). Paul Reynaud also made a speech on the 
necessity of involving the common people through a European Assembly, 
elected by universal suO rage (Reynaud, 1948). On the other hand, it is clear 
that fear and hope are always combining, even if in an unequal manner: 
there are more “positive” than “negative” reasons, more hope than fear. For 
instance, Raynaud’s speech criticizes the ones that have a too moderate and 
gradual stance on the European Project:
M. Macmillan, ancien ministre britannique (…) m’a oppose [sic] avec une 
charmante courtoisie un de ces dictons qui résument la sagesse française. Il m’a 
dit: Vous oubliez votre proverbe: « Hâtez-vous lentement ! »
To which he adds:
Mais, dire: « Hâtez-vous lentement » à un homme qui est en train de se 
noyer, c’est une ironie un peu macabre ! (Reynaud, 1948, p. 3)
  ere are no illusions throughout this foundational Congress: Europe 
must be done, not only for the sake of a greater good, but also to avoid some-
thing worse. Raymond Aron, for instance, speaks of a European Culture 
Center in order to avoid dictatorial institutions (Aron, 1948a). What is clear 
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for everyone is that things are not looking good for the European Nations: 
there is no other choice but to move on and, if not to forget nationalisms, 
at least to greatly diminish them. In the Hague Congress, the hope of an 
entirely new project is the norm, but this hope is always in some way inter-
twined with a sort of fear that pushes this movement forward.  ere is a 
positive and a negative impulse: a “we have to avoid something” that leads 
to a “we have to achieve something”.
  is idea is reinforced in the very % rst sentence of the Schuman 
Declaration of 1950: “World peace cannot be safeguarded without the 
making of creative eO orts proportionate to the dangers which threaten 
it” (Schuman, 1950).  erefore, the creation of institutions is necessary in 
order to create the basis of a European Federal order that will secure peace, 
i.e., avoid war:
By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, 
whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, 
this proposal will lead to the realization of the % rst concrete foundation of a 
European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace (Schuman, 
1950).
It could be argued that, aG er all, we were in the aG ermath of the war: it 
is therefore not surprising to see that fear is so present in those speeches. 
Nonetheless, and as I said, there is actually more hope than fear in these 
notable speeches that I quoted. In fact, what seems to be clear is that this 
mixture of fear and hope has never fully disappeared: the European Project 
is seen as an ideal, but also as an avoidance-mechanism. 
For instance, at the Messina Conference of 1955, where the six founda-
tional countries (France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands, 
and Belgium) started to draG  a nuclear and economic union, the situation 
was desperate: the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty failed to 
pass in France, which was a huge drawback for the European utopia. But, 
says Jean Monnet right aG er the Conference, the Europeans are assisting 
to a renewal of the European ideal: there must a progression toward the 
United States of Europe.
Il est très important que l’opinion publique comprenne la diO érence entre 
ces deux perspectives: l’une est l’avenir et le progrès; l’autre, le retour aux 
méthodes du passé dont nous avons connus l’ine  cacité et qui entraine la 
guerre (Monnet, 1955)
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  is dualism never disappears: the hope of progression in the European 
Construction is always present with the fear of regression. Even ten years 
aG er the Second World War, it is not necessarily the war that is invoked: it 
seems that the pro-European discourse recycles the events of the day in order 
to show that Europe is a necessity. For instance, in 1956, René Mayer, presi-
dent of the Coal and Steel Community, talked about the fact that, aG er the 
setback of the EDC, there was a rebirth of the European ideal for two reasons:
In the % rst place, the successful experience of the European Coal and Steel 
Community points the way toward similar (…) formulations in the other areas. 
Second, just as was the case with the Schuman Plan, the initiative of the Messina 
conference proceed from no doctrinaire enthusiasm for constitutional-making 
but rather out of urgency, out of a recognition that national solutions to the 
problems confronting us are inadequate (Mayer, 1956, pp. 11-12).
Almost as a kind of pattern, the same “positive-negative” vision of 
Europe emerges. Mayer talks at length of future successes of a uni% ed 
market that would embrace 160 millions of consumers. But he also speaks 
about the political security and stability that a uni% ed Europe could bring: 
“United Europe, for us, is not only an article of faith, it is a policy of insur-
ance” (Mayer, 1956, p. 13).
Because ten years have passed, there are no more references to the disas-
ter of the Second World War, but more to the “frustration of Western hopes 
and policies”. What are they? If one takes a look to the European 50’s, they are 
not hard to spot: those were the years of the Korean War, of the Suez Crisis, 
and when the French IV Republic fell.  ose were times where everything 
was happening. But Europe could only watch without acting.  en, it is not 
surprising to see that the “negative impulse” of the European Project was still 
present, but in a diO erent form: the Second World War is not pointed out 
as the European fear anymore; the pro-Europeans leaders replaced it with 
other events, like the inability of Europe to act in the global chess.
  is shiG  is very well highlighted by the % rst President of the European 
Economic Community (EEC), Walter Hallstein, right aG er the Treaty of 
Rome of 1958 that would create the Community:
  e danger which threatens us is not that we shall be relegated to a lesser 
place among the powers which decide the fate of the world, but that we shall 
be completely eliminated.  at is a deadly danger. Before our eyes, in this mid-
twentieth century, a world tragedy is being played out which is nothing less 
than the tragedy of freedom (Hallstein, 1958, p. 12).
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4.Technocratic discourse
Nonetheless, from the mid-% G ies onwards, the speeches tend to be more 
dispassionate and reZ ect less the negative and positive dualism we have 
been analyzing. Part of this change may be related to unprecedented opti-
mism during “les Trente glorieuses” year of economic growth in Europe. 
Again History seemed to follow a clear path, wars were far abroad and the 
new Europe an Oasis.
Hallstein’s speeches, for instance, are quite pragmatic: he is always cau-
tious in talking about the direct vantages of having a united agricultural 
policy (Hallstein, 1958) or a common market (Hallstein, 1960), but he is 
not very extensive on the European ideals or fears.
Even in the famous “empty chair crisis” of 1965 where France was block-
ing the decisions of the European institutions, the rhetoric of fear seem to 
have considerably disappeared.  ere are many references to the fact that 
Europe needs a bigger market and a common security policy, but the “nega-
tive-positive” rhetoric that has been analyzed is clearly blurred, even thought 
Hallstein, in 1965, described the empty chair crisis with these words:
For months now the European Economic Community has occupied the 
headlines in the papers and new broadcasts. It is going through a crisis, the 
most serious crisis since it was established in 1958 (Hallstein, 1965, p. 2).
Maybe this lack of rhetoric of fear is due to the fact that divergences 
in the European Process are gradually seen as being part of the process 
itself. Jean Rey, member of the EEC, said in a speech in 1965 that there 
was a negative and a positive aspect in the European Project: one based on 
the disagreements between governments, and the other based on the pro-
gresses that have been made despite those disagreements (Rey, 1965, p. 7). 
Hallstein is also convinced that, thanks to the treaties of Rome and Paris, 
the European Project has a basis to continue to carry on despite of the cri-
ses (Hallstein, 1965, pp. 15-16). Divisions do not seem to be so frightening 
anymore because they are seen as being part of the European Construction. 
As Pierre Werner, president of the Council of the European Communities, 
said in 1966 aG er the Luxembourg Compromise that would settle the empty 
chair crisis:
(…) nos industriels et nos agriculteurs raisonnent aujourd’hui en termes 
de marché commun et une crise institutionnelle, tout en les inquiétants, ne les 
en détourne pas (Werner, 1966, p. 5).
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Time has worked in favor of the European Community, argues Werner. 
Now that the countries have created the % rst European institutions, it is 
impossible for them to come back despite the crises: they always have to 
% nd the equilibrium in their interests. 
  ose statements show that the Hallstein (1958-1967) and Jean Rey 
(1967-1970) years were periods of much pragmatism for the European 
Process. “(…) a German weekly tells me that the idealistic drive to unite 
Europe has given way to a mole-like activity concerned with regulation of 
the market for lard and cheese” (Hallstein, 1967, p. 3), says Hallstein in one 
of his last speeches. But this, for him, is great news. Europe % nally made 
it from dream to reality, says Hallstein, from a rhetoric based on an idyl-
lic “esprit européen” to a more down-to-earth politics. I would say that, in 
the end, this “realistic” discourse that toned down the positive European 
rhetoric also had the same eO ect on the negative part of its rhetoric. In other 
words: without grandiloquent dreams, there are no dramatic apocalypses 
and, therefore, no rhetoric of fear. 
5. Warnings
But many members of the European institutions, throughout the years, have 
been advising against this too institutional and technical way of seeing Europe. 
Voices raised saying that the youth had to be heard and that more politi-
cal integration was necessary (Coppe, 1970, pp. 2-3; Deniau, 1969, pp. 5-8). 
Nonetheless, the 1974 energy crisis occurred and the % rst European elec-
tions had to be postponed for 1979.  In the meantime, and because of the 
crisis, we can see a regain of the rhetoric of fear. Many speeches picture this 
moment of anxiety that took over the European institutions. For instance, 
the vice-president of the Commission, Wilhelm Haferkamp, says that the 
energy crisis is creating divisions among the states of the Union. In a speech 
he made in 1974, the vice-president warns that, if the member states persist, 
then they can paralyze the European market, the Commission, and Europe’s 
ability to act politically in the world, problems which in turn can under-
mine the global peace and the very democracy of the European nations.
Que nous le voulions ou non: la rechute dans l’autarcie des petits Etats 
nationaux est désormais impossible sur le plan technique, économique et poli-
tique. Le repli dans la forteresse nationale entraînerait des eO ondrements struc-
turels, la récession et un chômage massif dans une mesure telle que certains 
Etats démocratiques pourraient ne pas y survivre (Haferkamp, 1974, p. 16).
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  e same year of crisis, Altiero Spinelli, member of the Commission, 
repeats this idea: this crisis brought deep divisions in the Union and 
Nationalism is clearly coming back. Europe will be incapable to act in 
the world if it starts to dream, once again, of autarchy. In these gloomy 
speeches, the criticism that the Community has been undemocratic is 
recurrent: Europe has to open itself to its citizens.  e idea that Hallstein 
and Rey cherished of a “necessary convergence” of the interests of the mem-
ber states is explicitly criticized: all the political forces must be brought in 
the European process in order for it to grow (Spinelli, 1974, pp. 16-17). 
Using Isaiah Berlin’s words, maybe we cannot expect to be completely 
free of hope and fear. What we put out of the door comes back through the 
window. Humanitarian individualism and romantic nationalism are at the 
front of the stage but no comprehensive solution seems available.
When we come to the end of this analysis, it seems that the years of the 
Hague Congress are long gone: if everyone spoke in very colorful terms in 
1948 about the European utopia and the disasters that would arise without 
it, the European rhetoric on fear has been progressively toned down and, 
today, seem to be punctually used in moments of greater anxiety.  e rheto-
ric of fear seems to be one that is mainly called upon in moments of crises.
It is nonetheless interesting to see this constant relationship between 
“positive” and “negative” rhetoric: in moments where great blueprints for 
Europe are absent, catastrophic scenarios seem to lack too. 
In the Hallstein and Rey years, two commissions that were explicitly 
pragmatic and “unromantic” in their approach, both components strongly 
disappeared.  e more the positive discourse of the Union is present, the 
more its negative side is altogether present. As Rougemont believed, the 
positive and negative sides of Europe are always together.  
À l’origine de la religion, de la culture et de la morale européenne, il y 
a l’idée de la contradiction, du déchirement fécond, du con5 it créateur (…) 
L’Européen typique sera tantôt un révolutionnaire ou un apôtre, un amant 
passionné ou un mystique, un polémiste ou un guerrier, un maniaque ou un 
inventeur. Son bien et son mal sont liés (Strenger, 2015)
Concluding, the idea of fear is an important aspect of the European 
Project, and not merely a rhetorical aspect that mainly appears in moments 
of crises. It is something structural to Europe, an essential side of it: it is 
more of an alarm bell that rings when the situation seems to be exception-
ally desperate. In general, this alarm will trigger the words “nationalisms”, 
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“doubts”, “protectionism” and “divisions”, the eternal enemies of a deeper 
European integration.  ere is no way to deny that this rhetorical trick is 
very powerful to remember the European states and citizens that, in order 
for Europe to maintain a global leading position, there are still no alterna-
tives to a deeper Union.
6. Concluding remarks
  is paper intended to present just an “exploratory” analysis of a limited set 
of political speeches and did not aim to show the overall role of the rhetoric 
of fear in the EU’s institutional discourses, but nonetheless we conclude 
that Rougemont was right in saying that “the real obstacles to a federa-
tion of Europe are not primarily in the East; they are here among us.” And 
today’s Europe’s leaders understood this idea quite well. If Isaiah Berlin was 
right, sharp divergence and ultimate collision of the ideals, individualism 
and nationalism will be part of the European landscape for long time.
  e actual malaise is oG en diagnosed as a lack of truer leadership that 
was maybe present in Adenauer’s era, or close to us, in Delors’ vision, but no 
longer exists. Today’s bureaucrats are not true statesman. It was also long ago 
diagnosed as a lack of democracy that the strengthening of the European par-
liament, a new constitution, and other great edi% ces could not however solve. 
  e European project, to use Raymond Aron’s dichotomy, has “not yet struck 
deep roots in society” and “no longer work” (Aron, 1990, p. 110). 
Our suggestion is that any analysis should take into account both the 
“irrational” and “unconscious” forces and the limitations of any institu-
tional solution. We do not rule out that fear can be an emotional response 
expressing a valid cognitive assessment. It can foster social cooperation 
against common enemies and external threats. But we think that the “peo-
ples” of the diO erent European nations—the audience of “great institutional 
discourses” of European leaders—are maybe less sensitive and so this rhet-
oric is less eO ective, if the barbarians are within our borders.  e clash of 
values and inner contradictions are now a given.
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